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Abstract 
The disqualification of directors or members of the management of a company, 
expressed as a prohibition for these persons to manage or take part in the management of the 
companies, is a highly significant Act of Company Law, which is implemented in many 
legislatures around the world. Utterly restrictive in its nature, it applies to the directors and 
members of the management team, and in some legislation systems even to the capital 
owners of the companies whose illegal actions initiate its application. The activation of this 
institution in precisely determined situations most often results in the prohibition of a 
particular person to manage a company for a definite period of time. 
These restrictive measures are effected with the purpose of establishing certain control in 
trading, while imposing limitations to a certain focus group. In its nature, these measures 
differ from those brought into effect in order to instigate entrepreneurship. For 
entrepreneurship in a given country to flourish would necessitate the realization of a 
liberalized regulation of the market.   
This paper focuses on the impact that this restrictive institution has in practice, and whether it 
is in fact achieving the objective(s) for which it was legally established. Particular attention is 
given to the adverse consequences that directors’ disqualification may bring on 
entrepreneurial freedom and innovation, and how this in turn could influence directly or 
indirectly economic growth or in weathering the recessional storm(s). 
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Introduction 
The disqualification of mangers or management structures in trade companies is an 
institute with which the European and other legislatures around the world are familiar with. 
The extent of its application depends primarily upon the traditions in the understanding of 
certain institutes in the field of the Company Law, Bankruptcy Law and Insolvency.   
 It is an act which entails prohibition, most often by court order, for members of 
management in companies whose conduct met certain legal conditions, which entails 
disqualification. We use the term ‘members of management’ because this disqualification or 
exclusion from the market may encompass a wider circle of people beside directors who took 
part in the management of a particular company and who, whilst managing the company, 
violated in some way or other the respective legal norms to determine prohibition.   
 In accordance with the legislation, the disqualification in most cases involves 
prohibition for the persons to take part in the establishment, management and organization of 
the existing and/or other companies. Thus, persons that are under such constraint, become 
disengaged from the management positions of the companies for a certain period of time, and 
they are banned from that position in new companies. The duration of this exclusion is in 
proportion to the degree of illegal conduct and it is estimated by the institution that enacts it. 
To record the persons who have been disqualified from managing positions in the companies, 
a list is produced, and it is kept by some of the administrative bodies in charge of companies’ 
records. That list is at the disposal (with or without a certain fee) of the public, with sufficient 
transparency for the prospective creditors and investors.    
 As with every other prohibition, the restrictions imposed by the disqualification 
regime aims at achieving specific purposes. Historically, the main objective of directors’ 
disqualification has been to seek out those who abuse of the privilege of Limited Liability for 
their personal benefit at the expense of investors and the general public at large. They are 
sanctioned from trading for a period of time as determined by the Court. The restriction also 
acts as a warning to raise standards of commercial scrupulousness, discourages unfit conduct 
and gives irresponsible directors the chance of rehabilitation. Williams (2005) argued that it 
is now potentially developing into another means of control, with the onerous obligations of 
governance facing directors constantly increasing.  
Aims of Study 
 Firstly, this study provides a succinct overview of the literature on entrepreneurship 
and enterprise; namely on the meaning of the terms ‘entrepreneur’, ‘entrepreneurship’ and 
‘entrepreneurial process’. Secondly, it reviews the disqualification regime in relation to 
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company directors and members of the management team in the United Kingdom, Germany 
and the Balkans (comprising the Republic of Macedonia and Croatia). Thirdly, the study 
focuses on the consequences of the disqualification of members of management on the 
entrepreneurial orientation of firms. More specifically, the study provides seven hypotheised 
facts relating to the disqualification regime that could directly or indirectly impact negatively 
on entrepreneurship, and consequently on the economic growth or revival of countries. One 
question looms in this regard: Is the disqualification regime the best course of action in a time 
of economic recession?    
Entrepreneurship and Enterprise 
 This section provides an overview of the literature on the meaning of the term 
‘entrepreneur’, ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘the entrepreneurial process’.  
The Entrepreneur 
 Entrepreneurs are those individuals that through their drive to do good for themselves 
in terms of material gain and social status, contribute significantly to material progress in 
society, and act as change agents for economic growth (Hurley, 1999).  Through their energy, 
committed undertaking, and innovative behavior, their embeddedness in society helps to 
transform industry and society by injecting money in the economy and providing a vital 
source of employment for many.  Various bodies of literature provide an insight on the 
typical characteristics of a successful entrepreneur.  Four main components are central; strong 
innovativeness, a good knowledge of how the market functions, an ability to take risks, and 
the willingness to grasp opportunities (Yamada, 2004)   
 The entrepreneur paradigm which can be traced back to Schumpeter (1934) is 
underpinned by the innovation process.  Innovation has many facets.  Cooper (1998) lists 
three prominent innovation dimensions: (i) radical versus incremental, (ii) product versus 
process, and (iii) administrative versus technological.   
 The literature affirms the importance of the role played by the entrepreneur in the 
creation and early development of a firm (Van de Ven, 1980).   In this role the individual 
influences the firm’s direction, and contributes to the choice of strategy.  This is more 
pronounced in small entrepreneurial firms.  Studies attest that strategic decision making is 
affected by the entrepreneur’s personality and management style.  This is also evident in 
firms where entrepreneurs do not use formal techniques or specialized knowledge in strategic 
management, but implement ‘realized strategies’ (Mintzberg, 1978) which are formed from 
decisions made gradually, and sometimes unintentionally.       
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Entrepreneurship 
 Analogous to other concepts in the social sciences there exist no unanimity of a 
universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship.   Researchers agree that it is about 
creating something that has previously not existed.  The dynamic process leads to a change of 
state and is characterized by innovation, venturing orientation, and strategic renewal (Covin 
& Slevin, 1991) after the identification of opportunities (Shane & Venkatraman, 2000).  
Three main streams of research provide knowledge on this subject.  The first stream (e.g. 
Norburn & Birley, 1986) concern the examination of socioeconomic background factors, 
such as age, gender, social class, marital status, education, and ethnicity.  The second 
examines the personal characteristics of owner-managers (e.g. Beaver, 2002); among which 
their attitudes, traits, and preferences.  The situational and contextual factors comprise the 
third stream (e.g. Stanworth & Curran, 1976).   
 The subject has been researched through the examination of attitudes, traits, 
background, contextual circumstances, economic factors, gender, and geography.  An 
accepted definition of entrepreneurship is that it is a process of creating and building 
something of value (Timmons, 1994) through the pursuit of opportunity without regard to 
resources currently controlled (Stevenson & Sahlman, 1987).  The behavior of the individual 
within this process results in outcomes that energize the industry and the economy, and 
provide long-term sustainable benefits for society in general.   
 Entrepreneurship is viewed as having a functional, and an occupational character in 
the economics literature (e.g. Peneder, 2009; Harper, 2003).  The functional element of 
entrepreneurship contributes to our understanding of the functions of the entrepreneur in the 
context of economic development and growth.  Entrepreneurship contributes to employment.  
It enhances social and political stability, and it furnishes competitive power (Wennekers & 
Thurik, 1999).   Econometric evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is a vital determinant of 
economic growth, and a cost in terms of foregone economic growth will be incurred from its 
absence (Audretsch et al., 2002).  Policy makers across the world promote entrepreneurship 
as a means of creating jobs, improving international competitiveness, countering rising 
unemployment, and sustaining economic growth.  The high unemployment and stalled 
growth in most European countries has reinforced the determination of policy makers to use 
entrepreneurship as a vehicle for personal development in order to resolve social issues and 
strengthen economic growth.   
 The occupational aspect studies the person performing the entrepreneurial process as 
someone who starts and grows a business venture through innovation.  Schumpeter (1952) 
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acknowledged that entrepreneurs transform static equilibrium into a dynamic process of 
economic development through the exploitation of an innovation.  The entrepreneur 
contributes substantially to such economic progress and technological advances through the 
process of innovation.  This is an important determinant in the competitive challenges of 
enterprises and nation states.  The complexity of the innovation process requires not only an 
eclectic base of thinking and individual management skills, but also requires the appropriate 
fiscal and regulatory framework with which it can flourish.  Herbig et al. (1994) contend that 
innovation “requires three basic components: infrastructure, capital, and the entrepreneurial 
capacity to make the first two work”.  It is now accepted that policy makers encourage firms 
to progressively adopt an entrepreneurial culture. This can only be achieved through a 
business support infrastructure that embraces innovation.     
 Central to the study of entrepreneurship are the concepts of the entrepreneurial 
process and that of opportunity.  The former focuses on the patterns of economic activity that 
arise from the interaction of a multidimensional, complex and dynamic set of factors and 
circumstances.  This manifests itself in the start-up and growth of businesses.  The latter 
focuses on the behavior of the entrepreneur.  Entrepreneurial processes change over time and 
exist in different formats depending on the type of firm (Schwartz et al, 2005). 
Entrepreneurial Process 
 The Austrian School of thought views the entrepreneur as a person with three 
propensities: (i) risk-averseness (Knight, 1921); (ii) alertness to opportunities for economic 
profit (Kirzner, 1973); and (iii) innovativeness and creativity when exploiting opportunities 
(Schumpeter, 1934).   The entrepreneurial process of is embedded in market functioning.  It 
disrupts market equilibrium through the introduction of new combinations or successful 
innovations of goods and services in the economy.  During the process the new 
product/service combinations fuel economic development and growth and move the economy 
towards a newer equilibrium.  Schumpeter (1942) coined the term ‘creative destruction’ to 
denote a "process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one."   
 A large body of research views the entrepreneurial process as an emergent 
phenomenon made up of individual and environmental components (e.g. Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996).  The central argument is contingency thinking which binds the entrepreneur’s 
characteristics with the firm’s context.  Other researchers (e.g. Timmons & Spinelli, 2003) 
remove environmental factors from their models and focus specifically on the characteristics 
of the entrepreneur, individual or team; resources; and opportunity perception. This school of 
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thought investigates the traits manifested by entrepreneurs.  In these studies the 
characteristics and attitudes of individuals, their genetic predisposition, and the social 
development in their culture lends themselves inclined towards entrepreneurship.   
 In all models the individual plays a central role in the entrepreneurial process which 
gives rise to the emergence of new opportunities.  The exploitation of the opportunity 
progresses into the creation of a new product or service which the market will accept as 
novel.  The ongoing presence of the entrepreneur is central for success because he or she 
alone has the capacity to materialize and continually shape the organization so that value is 
created.  In this view entrepreneurship is a long and complex emergent process comprising of 
repeated interaction which gives new meaning in the light of the sense that the entrepreneur 
makes on the market.  An opportunity is therefore objective in the sense that it exists outside 
of the firm, but it is also socially constructed through activity interaction.  The entrepreneurial 
process is thus “dynamic and constant emerging, being realized, shaped and constructed 
through social processes” (Fletcher, 2003).  
 It is the stream of social networks, structures and environments that an entrepreneur 
engages in that makes up the entrepreneurial process.  Chang (2004) states that opportunities 
are dependent on the nature of interaction and the pre-existing conditions that underlie such 
interaction.  These are captured by the entrepreneur, who through a long and complex 
emergent process of sense-making provides value in the market.  The process has therefore 
no specific end, and there is actually no pre-defined goal taking the entrepreneur towards 
unforeseen directions. 
Review of Disqualification in the U.K., Germany and the Balkans 
United Kingdom 
 The establishment of the Act “disqualification of managers” and its implementation in 
the Common Law system is based upon the notion of insolvency not only as a private legal 
creditor/debtor relation but also as an Act which is significant for Public Law as well as the 
whole community. 
 The liberal acts on the Island for establishment of a company, primarily the exclusion 
of the minimal capital as a prerequisite for founding a company, have certainly been a reason 
for introducing acts that will serve the purpose of protecting the company creditors. Legal 
provisions which entail institutes as “disqualification of managers” together with “piercing 
the corporate veil”- or the personal responsibility of the managers for the company debts (in 
particular cases) are exact such measures. 
European Scientific Journal    March 2013 edition vol.9, No.7    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
20 
 
 The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 seeks to protect  the general public 
against abuses of the corporate form. The effect  of a disqualification order is that a person 
shall not, without the leave of the court: 2 
Be a director of a company, or a liquidator or administrator of a 
company, or be a receiver or manager of a company’s property or, in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, 
formation or management of a company, for a specified period beginning with 
the date of the order. 3 (Section 1(1)).   
 A disqualified person cannot, therefore, act in any of the alternative  capacities listed. 
For example, a disqualified director cannot  participate in the promotion of a new company 
during the  disqualification period, nor can he be ‘concerned’ or ‘take part in’ the  
management of a company by virtue of acting in some other  capacity, such as a management 
consultant.4 
 The Disqualified Directors Register is a register of persons who have either been 
disqualified through a court order or by an undertaking of the Insolvency Service from being 
directors of companies or members of LLPs. The register shows the length of time the 
director or member has been disqualified. It also shows the section of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 that the director has been disqualified under. 
 The duration of the disqualification is between 2 to 15 years. In determining the 
duration of disqualification, previous disqualification orders of the individuals in question 
must be considered as well as the degree of guilt and the measure of incompetence5. 
Violations of the disqualification order are punished by up to two years in prison or fines. 
When can disqualification occur? 
 Undischarged bankrupts and persons whose orders are revoked by the Court due to a 
default in payment under a county court administration order are automatically disqualified 
by the Court. 
 In practice, most of disqualifications are ordered on the basis of unfitness. According 
to this section, the court is obliged to issue a disqualification of legal or natural persons if this 
person is or was a director or shadow director of a company which has become insolvent. 
Additionally, the Court must be convinced that the conduct of this person as a director 
                                                          
2 A.J. Dignam, J.P. Lowry, “Corporate Finance and management issues in company law”, section c: Corporate 
management I, revised edition, University of London Press, London 2009 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Marcus Lutter, Legal Capital in Europe, Special volume 1, p. 264, De Gruyter Rechtswissenschaften Verlags-
Gmbh, Berlin 2006 
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“makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company”. A director can be 
disqualified upon conviction for an indictable offense in connection with the promotion, 
formation, management, or liquidation of a company, or in connection with the receivership 
or management of a company’s property, including the conducting of business without legal 
authorization - company law regulations are violated.6 A director can also be disqualified for 
persistently failing to comply with the provisions of companies’ legislation requiring 
document filing with the registrar of companies. A disqualification order can be issued if it 
appears that, in the course of the winding up of the company, a person has engaged in 
wrongful and fraudulent trading, whether or not convicted or has otherwise been guilty of 
other fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of duty as an officer, liquidator, 
receiver, or manager7. A disqualification on the basis of violations of competition law occurs 
when a company violates competition law and the court holds the director to be unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company. “Capital Market disqualification”occurs 
whenever someone buys or sells stocks on the regulated market and uses insider information 
to his benefit and so is criminally liable. Whoever is sentenced for such a criminal act can be 
disqualified pursuant, assuming that the carrying out of the criminal act can be linked to the 
management of the company in question8  
 Moreover, when a company has failed, the OR (or IP in a creditors' voluntary 
liquidation, an administrative receivership or an administration) has to send the Secretary of 
State a report on the conduct of all directors who were in office in the last 3 years of the 
company's trading. The Secretary of State has to decide whether it is in the public interest to 
seek a disqualification order. Any application is heard and decided by the court. Examples of 
conduct which may lead to disqualification include: 
• Continuing to trade to the detriment of creditors at a time when the company was 
insolvent. 
• Failure to keep proper accounting records. 
• Failure to prepare and file accounts or make returns to Companies House. 
• Failure to submit tax returns or pay over to the Crown tax or other money due. 
• Failure to co-operate with the OR/IP. 
 
                                                          
6 Andrew Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit?, Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants Research Report (London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1998) at 35. 
7 CDDA, supra note 7, s. 2(1) 
8 Marcus Lutter, Legal Capital in Europe, Special volume 1, p. 263-264, De Gruyter Rechtswissenschaften 
Verlags-Gmbh, Berlin 2006 
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Germany 
 Directors` disqualification is already used in certain fields of German Law. Corporate 
Law goes beyond the mere requirement that managers and the board members have such 
ordinary attributes such as legal capacity. For example, pursuant to s. 6 (2) s. 3, 4 GmbHG 
and s. 76 (3) s. 3, 4 AktG, a manager must also be free of any sentences related to insolvency 
criminality or of professional or occupational disqualification or any other form of civil legal 
disqualification9.  
 Insolvency criminality leading to a directors` disqualification under German law is 
exclusively connected to Chapter 24 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, this only involves 
bankruptcy (s 283 c StGB - Bankrott) grievous bankruptcy (s 283a StGB – Besonders 
Schwerer Fall des Bankrotts), violation of proper accounting (s 283b StGB – Verletzung der 
Buchfuhrungspflicht), the preferential treatment of creditors (s 283 c StGB - 
Glaubugerbegunstigung), and the preferential treatment of debtors (s 283d StGB- 
Schuldnerbegunstigung). Nevertheless, criminal act committed abroad may also be of 
consequence, though such acts must also be considered criminal by the foreign legal regime. 
The committed crime must be related to the commercial objective or occupation of the 
corporate entity in question. Other criminal acts are not penalized by s. 6 (2) 3 GmBHG and s 
76 (3) 3 AktG.  
The Balkans 
 The Balkans, from a legal aspect, have always been inclined towards the German 
legal circle, adopting and adapting decisions characteristic of this legal system, which is 
rather different from the common law system. In the area of the Company Law, the same 
practice has been followed, so that the countries like Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia, 
in their company laws have included a number of laws which originate from and are applied 
to the German laws which regulate that field. 
 When such regulations as directors disqualification are concerned, it seems that in the 
Republic of Macedonia and Croatia, the approach is much more restrictive towards the circle 
of persons and the reasons for which such restrictive measures as directors’ disqualification 
are imposed. 
Republic of  Macedonia 
 In the Republic of Macedonia, a novelty has been introduced with the amendments to 
the law on companies from April 9, 2010, (Official Gazette no. 48) by which a prohibition for 
founding companies is introduced if certain conditions are met, as well as prohibition in 
                                                          
9 Ibid, p.257 
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certain occasions for persons to be members of management and supervision bodies of 
companies.  
 Thus it is stated that: 
 A company cannot be founded by: 
1. Legal entities whose bank account opened at any of the carriers of the financial trade 
(the banks) is blocked10 and the persons who are members of the management or 
supervision bodies of these companies, for the period of time the account is blocked, 
or until it undergoes the procedure of bankruptcy. 
2. Companies which undergo the bankruptcy procedure, for the time of the duration of 
the procedure.   
3. A person who is a member (capital owner) of a Company with Limited Liability (only 
Ltd. not public company ) the account of which has been blocked, for the period of 
time the account is blocked, or until it undergoes the procedure of bankruptcy. 
4. Persons for whom the court has decided to have committed a criminal offense of false 
bankruptcy, causing bankruptcy by improper management, misapplication of the 
bankruptcy procedure, damage or preference of creditors. 
The persons under 1, 3 and 4 are not allowed to be managers, member of a managing 
body or a supervising body of a company for the period of time that these restrictions 
are present.  
 For the persons who are under prohibition for founding a company and for 
those who are not allowed to take part in the company management and supervising 
bodies, there is a separate register within the Central Registry Office. 
 It is a fact that these acts are rather extensively set and plan prohibitions not only for 
the managers/supervisors of the companies but also for the members of the companies of 
limited liability, which represent the most common mode of the business organization in the 
country.  
 Apparently, a number of rather restrictive acts are imposed, that go further in their 
attempt to provide certain market safety and protection of the creditors. The justification is 
questionable, especially in a period of a world economic crisis during which the legislatures 
prefer acts which are liberal and motivating for the prospective entrepreneurs. For instance, 
                                                          
10 Company`s bank account could be blocked (by the creditor, who has already provided a legal document 
which confirms the debt) due to the inability to pay its debts. It will be blocked until new finances arrive, so that 
the creditor can  withdraw his amount. 
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recently, the Macedonian government introduced numerous measures in order to encourage 
the potential entrepreneurs in their business realizations. 
 In addition to this, in a time when the state itself as a result of the economic crises is 
late with its payments (debts) towards the private sector, such acts that impose prohibition to 
the managers or the capital owners because of the company insolvency and the block of its 
account, a consequence of temporary insolvency, look pretty severe. 
Croatia 
 The legislation in Croatia had even previously imposed upon the founder/s of 
companies when founding the company, to submit a signed statement (in addition to the other 
documents) by which they confirm that they are not owners or co-owners of a company that 
has a blocked bank account (insolvent company). 
 Apart from referring to the founders, the new legal regulations impose a prohibition 
on the members of the family of the person in possession of insolvent companies in founding 
a company. Thus, the Croatian legislature imposes prohibitions that sanction persons that 
may have not previously participated in the market.11 It is hard to imagine being forbidden to 
establish a company because of a previous business failure of a member of your family! 
 Thus, the legislature decidedly imposes prohibition on establishment of new 
companies for those entrepreneurs who have had at least unsuccessful business venture and 
as a result have an insolvent company, which has still not undergone the adequate procedure 
for deletion from the register. This undoubtedly represents an obstruction to entrepreneurship 
and sanctions the entrepreneur who for certain reasons has not managed in the successful 
realization of the business venture.  
 The authorities in the previously mentioned legislatures (U.K., Germany and 
Macedonia) focus most of these restrictive measures on the members of the management of 
the company. Unlike them, the Croatian legal decisions contain restrictions mainly referring 
to the capital owners.    
 Moreover, according to the new provisions, the institute “piercing the corporate veil”, 
with the forthcoming alterations, would mean that if the legal person is not able to clear the 
debts, the creditors in order to collect the debts, apart from the personal assets of the 
founders, can also use the other legal entities owned by the same founder. Furthermore, the 
managing directors of the insolvent company are liable to the creditors with their personal 
assets. 
                                                          
11 Tax Law amends, Official Gazette, no. 78/12 
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 The new alterations also plan the so called “shortened administrative procedure” with 
which the Inland Revenue Department is authorized, if they discover irregularities in the 
functioning of the company, (namely a procedure not conducted by the Court) to appropriate 
not only the property of the legal entity, but also the personal property of the founder. 
 Needless to say, these regulations generate insecurity for the entrepreneur. They 
significantly capacitate the state and its discretionary right in the decisions concerning the 
private property of the company holders. As a logical result of that, these regulations are 
demotivating for the present or prospective entrepreneur.    
Impact of Directors’ disqualification on entrepreneurship 
 Although delinquent directors and/or members of the management team who are 
guilty of misconduct deserve to be disciplined, there have been cases where honest persons 
have been disqualified “in a bid to save jobs by keeping the company trading” or because of 
what they might consider to be “quite small matters, such as errors in paperwork” (Damon 
Watt, as cited in Moules, 2012). There are also cases where businesses go bankrupt because 
of bad luck or unexpected circumstances (e.g. economic downturn), and not because of 
irresponsible risk taking. In decision theory, a good decision is one that uses all the available 
information, considers all possible alternatives and is rational. In the same sense, directors of 
companies are required to be prudent in their decisions, to consider all the risks involved and 
to avoid reckless and speculative trades and/or investments. Apart from this, a director cannot 
be passive. When a director feels that the Board is taking the wrong decision, especially in 
the case of trading in the prospect of insolvency, the director is responsible to take a stand 
and to protest against the implementation of the decision s/he does not support. The director 
is also expected to resign in such circumstances, rather than staying on board for fees and 
status associated with his position. However, if the director decides not to resign, his/her 
conduct will be considered independently, not collectively.  
 Good decisions can be affected by unexpected or unfavorable circumstances, resulting 
in bad outcomes. In such cases, that original decision remains a good decision just the same. 
However, outcome-based decisions cannot be entirely avoided and good managers can suffer 
from bad outcomes, not of their own making. For instance, Ariely (2010) gives an example of 
a chain that lost money when the stock went down, and the good manager incurs financial 
penalties or is fired, so that Board saves face and appears to be taking action. The founders of 
McDonalds (Ray Kroc) and Walmart (Sam Walton) failed in at least one entrepreneurial 
venture before making a success. What would have happened to these established world-
renowned entrepreneurs if this Act was in place back then? What would have been the impact 
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on entrepreneurship and the economy if they were disqualified?   Isn’t this proof that failure 
is only the stepping stone to greater heights? 
 Entrepreneurs take calculated risks while investors and creditors take financial risks in 
support of these enterprises. Laws and regulation are there to promote legal activities and to 
discourage illegal activities.  With the exception of the illegal act, the market must remain 
free.  In the long-run, capital moves away from the less efficient decision makers to the smart 
ones.  Those who make bad decisions become victims of their own decision making. This is 
how the free market operates. As Lee and Gladstone (1997) put it: “It is an unusual 
‘enterprise’ culture that protects investors from such individuals through heavy-handed legal 
insensitivity to the wisdom of economic forces” (p. 134). They add that it is clear that the Act 
can effectively criminalize decision-making mistakes made by directors. Thus, the same laws 
primarily aimed at protecting the general public from directors who have contributed to the 
insolvency by negligence, misappropriation or misconduct of company assets, are also likely 
to stifle entrepreneurship and damage the health of our economy (Lee & Gladstone, 1997). 
The following are a few examples of how the shortcomings and the consequences of 
directors’ disqualification could impact negatively on entrepreneurship:  
1. They disallow experienced entrepreneurs and founders of failed firms from re-
entering the market due to various factors such as long-term or permanent 
disqualification, or due to the lack of available credit, in cases where the entrepreneur 
becomes personally bankrupt after the insolvency.  
2. After suffering disqualification procedures, some entrepreneurs may experience a loss 
of perceived ability or become risk averse to own or manage future companies after 
the disqualification. Hence, when these entrepreneurs take decisions based on 
calculated risks, they may choose not to the risk ever again, thus depriving the 
“economy of an experienced and vital force for innovation” (Gladstone & Lee, 1995, 
p. 55). 
3. They might potentially discourage innovative individuals with valid enterprise from 
entering the market for the first time, resulting in a loss of new engines which are 
crucial for economic revival and/or growth.   
4. There are multiple reasons why a business can go bankrupt. However, with business 
failure becoming more and more stigmatized, a number of honest bankrupts continue 
to be stigmatized due to association with dishonesty.  
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5. When an honest director is asked to justify his/her actions in the Court, 
acknowledging that the Court may not be the best place to appreciate risk-taking and 
enterprise, may tend to lead him/her to act in an overly protective manner to avoid 
disqualification, thereby discouraging genuine risk-taking and entrepreneurship 
(Kennedy, 2002).  
6. The process of disqualification is generally lengthy and not a very cost-effective way 
of establishing misconduct, since the exercise used does not determine whether the 
director is currently unfit but whether the he/she infringed some particular detail in 
the past (Hicks, 1999). With the rise in harsh economic conditions, there has been a 
rise in disqualification orders (Moules, 2012). This means that the governments are 
spending more and possibly with limited benefit in protecting the public. It would be 
more appropriate if more cost-effective procedures are found and the money saved is 
invested in educational programs for potential entrepreneurs and/or to support 
struggling businesses to cope with tough times.  
7. The negative effect of directors’ disqualification on entrepreneurship may be further 
extenuated when disqualification orders in other countries may lead to disqualification 
in a given country. The freedom of establishment principle of the Treaty which is set 
out in Article 49 enables an economic operator to carry an activity in more than one 
member state. The principle of the freedom to provide services, a set out in Article 56, 
gives the economic provider the freedom to provide services in more than one state 
without having to be established. These two principles are central to the effective 
functioning of the EU internal Market (European Commission, 2011). It is a known 
fact that entrepreneurs in a given country strategically take advantage of inexpensive 
and faster incorporation facilities in other countries and extend their services to other 
countries. The provisions to extend  disqualification to those directors who have been 
disqualified overseas is legitimate, in the sense that it will help to prevent rogue 
directors from taking advantage of incorporation facilities in other countries such as 
the UK . However, what about those cases where the honest director has been unjustly 
disqualified? Omar (2009) pointed out that there is the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
information from foreign authorities and “whether the automatic disqualification 
would infringe the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European convention on 
Human Rights” (p. 41).    This is a clearly major concern for directors who operate on 
a global basis and impacts entrepreneurial migration. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that the Disqualification Act originally targeted only directors and singled 
them out for legal control has been described in the literature as illogical (Lee & Gladstone, 
1997). This criticism might explain why new disclosure regimes go beyond the directors and 
include members of the management of a company, as in the case of the U.K., Germany and 
the Balkans, which we reviewed in this paper. In the case of the Balkans, the new legislation 
on disqualification incorporates restrictions even for founders of the companies in particular 
situations. More specifically, we saw that Croatians have provisions where "Due to current 
insolvency, if the firm has it’s bank account blocked, the founder(s) is not allowed to 
establish new firms during the insolvency, and even his family members are subjected to 
these constraints". In our opinion, these restrictions go beyond providing market safety and 
protection to investors, and stifle further entrepreneuship in the Balkans; clearly not the right 
course of action in a time of harsh economic recession.  
The government might see effective enforcement of the disqualification regime as a 
vital in its quest to support entrepreneurship and enterprise. However,  the disqualification 
regime runs counter to the concept of free enterprise, where investors are free to take the risks 
with minimal government control, and can operate in an economic system that rewards on the 
basis of the investors’ keen insight in their investment decisions.   
We believe that the disqualification regime might inhibit genuine entrepreneurship, 
resulting in a significant drag on economic growth and prosperity, at a time when all 
governments should be findings measures in order to encourage potential entrepreneurs in 
their business realizations and to stimulate the economy in their country and to 
weather/overcome the recessional storm(s).  
In conclusion, most of the points we raised in this paper are not backed with empirical 
evidence. We believe that there is a need for more focused empirical and inductive research 
that attempts to support or contradict our hypotheses. Such research would better inform 
policy makers in their quest to protect investors and the public at large from dishonest 
company directors and members of management, without stifling entrepreneurship in their 
country.  
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